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Experiments on static intertemporal choice ￿nd evidence of partic-
ularly extreme impatience toward immediate rewards. While this is
often taken as support for hyperbolic discounting, it could also arise
because the most likely participants in experiments are also those with
the most immediate need for money. We conduct a calibration exer-
cise and ￿nd that the extreme impatience observed in experiments can
be accommodated by a standard exponential discounting model with
no discounting and expectation of a ￿ small￿increase in the base con-
sumption level. The calibration uses existing estimates of curvature
of utility.
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11 Introduction
The standard model of intertemporal choice, the exponential discounting
model, posits that agents discount the utility of a reward by an exponen-
tial discount function: D(t) = ￿
t for ￿ 2 (0;1). Most experiments on in-
tertemporal choice investigate discount functions by observing the manner
in which subjects trade-o⁄ money and time, as revealed in subjects￿choices
between dated rewards (money-time pairs (m;t)) at a given point in time. A
sizeable experimental literature provides evidence that appears to reject the
standard model (see [6] for a review of the evidence). A ￿nding from this
literature that has received much attention in economics is that subjects￿dis-
count functions possess the decreasing impatience property: subjects tend to
be more impatient in their money-time trade-o⁄s when the trade-o⁄s involve
more immediate dated rewards. This motivates the hyperbolic discounting
model, which adopts the discount function D(t) = 1
1+t (Ainslie [1]).1 The
popular psychological explanation for decreasing impatience is the presence
of a desire for immediate grati￿cation and the inability to exert self-control.
The evidence has been used to suggest the existence of extreme self-control
problems.
The evidence for decreasing impatience is based on direct estimates of
discount functions and also on peculiar properties of behavior. Thaler [13]
asks subjects to specify the amount of money they would require in [one
month/one year/ten years] to make them indi⁄erent to receiving $15 now.
From the median responses [$20/$50/$100] it is inferred that subjects use
an average annual discount rate of 345% over a one-month horizon, 120%
over a one-year horizon and 19% over a ten-year horizon, thereby suggesting
decreasing impatience and extreme desire for immediate grati￿cation. Ainslie
and Haslam [2] report that ￿a majority of subjects say they would prefer
to have a prize of a $100 certi￿ed check available immediately over a $200
certi￿ed check that could not be cashed before 2 years; the same people do not
prefer a $100 certi￿ed check that could be cashed in 6 years to a $200 certi￿ed
check that could be cashed in 8 years.￿Such behavior, known as a preference
reversal, suggests decreasing impatience in the increased willingness to wait
an extra 2 yrs for an extra $100 when the trade-o⁄ is farther in the future.
1The general decreasing impatience model is de￿ned by a discount function D that
satis￿es the property that
D(t+1)
D(t) increases with t. A generalized hyperbolic discounting
model is introduced by Lowenstein and Prelec [11] and the more tractable quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model is studied by Laibson [10] and subsequent literature.
2However, in order to infer the underlying discount function from prefer-
ences over dated rewards, it is necessary that the worth to the subject of
an extra dollar (the marginal utility for money) be the same across time. It
is clear that a subject who is relatively cash constrained today will exhibit
the behavior patterns in the evidence even if his underlying discount func-
tion is exponential. A potential concern is that experiments (typical subjects
of which are undergraduates) may systematically ￿nd such subjects because
those with the most need for cash are also the most likely participants in
experiments.2
There is little evidence available to evaluate the extent and signi￿cance of
such selection bias. The following ￿ndings in Zauberman and Lynch [14] are
suggestive. These authors directly elicit subjects￿expectations regarding the
future ￿slackness￿in their budgets. In [14, experiment 1], for instance, 76
undergraduates responded on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (= much more
slack today) to 10 (= much more slack a month from today). Although the
time-horizon was only one month, the mean response was 7.0 with a notably
large standard deviation of 2.9. See also [14, experiment 7].3
Without the assumption of constant marginal utility for money across
time (the ￿ constant marginal utility￿assumption for short) the evaluation
of money depends on time, and consequently the standard model ceases to
have any peculiar testable implications for preferences over dated rewards
other than basic restrictions such as monotonicity and transitivity. Indeed,
qualitative ￿ndings such as preference reversals no longer reject the model.
We conduct a calibration exercise to get a sense of the model￿ s ability to
￿t quantitative ￿ndings, speci￿cally estimated discount functions. We show
that the extreme self-control problem suggested by the well-known ￿ndings in
Thaler [13] is in fact also consistent with a standard exponential discounting
model (CARA utility) with no discounting and a very slight relaxation of the
constant marginal utility assumption (as re￿ ected in close-to-zero changes
in anticipated base consumption levels). The calibration uses estimates of
CARA utility based on aggregate consumption data and also some recent
data on choice under risk.
The results suggest that an accounting of expectations may be desirable
2We owe this observation to Alessandro Lizzeri.
3In the psychology literature, Zauberman and Lynch [14] show that the anticipation
of ￿slack￿ in a relevant resource (speci￿cally, time or money) is related to the pattern
of discounting. This work comes closest in spirit to ours given that resource slack is
interpretable in terms of marginal utility.
3in experimental studies that seek to elicit discount functions.
2 Eliciting Discount Functions
This section outlines how experiments elicit discount functions and derives
the relationship between estimates and the marginal utility of money. Cali-
bration results follow in Section 3.
2.1 DU-Rationalizability
For the nondegenerate set of rewards M = [0;M] and the set of dates T =
N+, denote by % a preference relation over the set of dated rewards X =
M ￿ T . Indi⁄erence is denoted by ￿ and strict preference by ￿.






and integrates any dated reward (m;t) into his anticipated base-consumption











() D(t)[u(bt + m) ￿ u(bt)] ￿ D(t
0)[u(bt0 + m
0) ￿ u(bt0)];
and thus the representation induced on % is
U(m;t) = D(t)[u(bt + m) ￿ u(bt)]: (1)
That is, a dated reward (m;t) is evaluated according to the discounted in-
crease in utility due to (m;t). Say that % is DU-rationalizable if it admits
4We assume that D is a discount function in the sense that it satis￿es D(0) = 1 and
D(t) is strictly decreasing and tends to 0 as t ! 1. Moreover u is strictly increasing and
continuous.
4such a representation U for some discount function D; strictly increasing
continuous utility u and (bt)t2T .5
Observe that the receipt of a reward (m;t) matters only to the extent that
it adds to the anticipated base-consumption level bt at t, and in particular,
that the marginal utility of the reward is determined by bt. Thus, in the
discounted utility model￿ s abstraction, di⁄erences in base-consumption over
time is the only vehicle for talking about the marginal utility of a reward
depending on t. Consequently, it must be viewed as a stand-in for all the
factors that might in￿ uence marginal utility.
2.2 Elicitation
Most experimental ￿ndings (such as decreasing impatience, the magnitude
e⁄ect, the sign e⁄ect, etc.) are properties of estimated discounted functions.
The estimation is based on the following procedure.
By having the subject face a sequence of choices, or by asking him directly,
the experiments elicit the present equivalent  (m;t) of any dated reward
(m;t):
( (m;t);0) ￿ (m;t):
This information is used to construct a discount function by setting, for all






For instance, if $80 is the present equivalent of ($100;t) then the subject is
said to discount the $100 reward by a factor of ￿
100(t) = 0:8. We refer to
￿
m(t) as the subject￿ s money-discount function.
Money-discount functions are viewed as estimates of the subjects￿under-
lying discount function when the size of rewards used are small. The justi￿ca-
tion for the claim comes from the presumption that utility over small intervals
is approximately linear, but also crucially depends on the constant marginal
5This de￿nition rests on an implicit commitment assumption: for any (m;t), the money
m is consumed entirely at time t without any other changes in the consumption stream.
Note that perfect consumption smoothing implies that money-discount functions (de￿ned
by (2) below) must be exponential: a $m reward at t is only good as its present value
m
(1+r)t, and thus for all m, ￿
m(t) = 1
(1+r)t. Since nonexponential money-discount functions
are a robust ￿nding in the experiments, restricting attention to imperfect consumption
smoothing is justi￿ed, and the commitment assumption serves as a useful benchmark in
this case.
5utility assumpion. Note ￿rst that by the assumption of DU-rationalizability
(1) and the de￿nition of present equivalents, for any (m;t);
u(b0 +  (m;t)) ￿ u(b0) = D(t)[u(bt + m) ￿ u(bt)]: (3)
Assuming di⁄erentiability where needed, di⁄erentiating with respect to m




u0(b0) . Given  (0;t) = 0











But then, for concave u, the claim that ￿
m(t) approximates D(t) for small
m is justi￿ed only when bt is close to b0.
3 Calibration
Consider the evidence in Thaler [13] where, on average, agents exhibit:
($15; now) ￿ ($20;1 month), ($50; 1 yr), ($100;10 yrs). (5)
These preferences imply that ￿under the constant marginal utility assump-
tion and under the assumption that rewards of $100 or less are su¢ ciently
￿small￿rewards ￿on average the subjects use an annual discount rate of
345%, 120% and 19% over a one-month, one-year horizon and ten-year hori-
zon respectively. This suggests an extreme desire for immediate grati￿cation
and corresponding self-control problem, and motivates the hyperbolic dis-
counting model.
We determine how much change in base-consumption over time is re-







with CARA utility u(c) = 1￿e￿ac
a ; a > 0. Use (3) to determine that for any
(m;t);






t 1 ￿ e￿am
1 ￿ e￿a (m;t)
￿
: (6)
6In all that follows we assume no discounting, ￿ = 1; observe that this biases
results upward. Taking values for (m;t) from (5) delivers values for bt ￿ b0
that depend only on the coe¢ cient a that controls the curvature of utility.
The unit of time is a month.
The appropriate data for judging a theory of intertemporal choice is in-
tertemporal substitution data. We consider estimates of a from the macro-
economics literature. Gregory, Lamarche and Smith [7] use US aggregate
consumption data on nondurables and services for the period 1959-1998 and
estimate an Euler equation with CARA utility. They provide a range of
estimates, the smallest being a = 0:124.6 This is in line with various macro-
economic studies that ￿nd that estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution based on aggregate consumption data or consumption data of
the average consumer (non-stockholders) is typically close to 0 (Hall [8], At-
tansio et al [3]). Table 1 below shows that for a = 0:124, and in fact for values
of a as small as 0:01, the data (5) can be accommodated with a practically
constant base-consumption stream.
Estimates of a based on choice under risk are not directly relevant for
judging a theory of intertemporal choice. Nevertheless, we note that some
recent estimates of a based on choice under risk yield values higher than 0:01.
Choi, Fisman, Gale and Kariv [4] ￿nd that a disappointment aversion model
￿ts better then expected utility; their speci￿cation with a CARA utility index
yields a mean estimate of a = 0:086.7 The value of a based on the ￿ large-
stakes￿treatment data in Holt and Laury [9] is a = 0:032.8 The corresponding
calibrated values of bt￿b0 are given in Table 1. For perspective, we also report
calibrated values corresponding to the mean estimate a = 0:0031 obtained
in Cohen and Einav [5] by estimating a structural econometric model using
6The values reported in [7, Table 4] are based on annual consumption measured in units
of $10,000. The smallest value (103:7) translates to a value of 0:12444 when consumption
is measured in monthly terms and units of $1, as required for our purposes. We thank
Gregor Smith for clari￿cations and the translation into our setting.
7The values reported in [4, Table 3] are based on consumption in units of experimental
currency. We thank Syngjoo Choi for providing us with the estimate that takes $1 as the
unit of consumption.
8Holt and Laury [9] do not estimate a CARA utility. The ￿gure is taken from [5, Table
3] who estimate a CARA utility for the ￿￿90￿treatment in [9].
7data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts.
a b1 ￿ b0 b12 ￿ b0 b120 ￿ b0
0.124 $0:7 $1:4 $1:4
0.100 $1:1 $2:5 $2:5
0.086 $1:5 $3:6 $3:7
0.032 $6:7 $23:1 $28:8
0.010 $26:3 $103:8 $151:3
0.0031 $90:3 $371:2 $570:7
Table 1: Approximate change in monthly base-consumption
over t months; t 2 f1;12;120g, for di⁄erent values of a:
The approximation in (4) for ￿ small￿m reveals clearly that even after
restricting attention to an exponential discount function D(t) = ￿
t, by vary-
ing ￿ and u one can ￿nd a large range of possible base-consumption streams
that can accommodate any given money-discount function ￿
m(t). For in-
stance, given the data (5), the calibrated values for b120 ￿ b0 above could be
increased by requiring u to exhibit weakly decreasing absolute risk aversion
via a reduction in curvature beyond a particular point. Moreover, all cali-
brated values are lower if we take ￿ < 1, and with a suitable ￿ the calibrated
base-consumption stream can even be decreasing.
While we have shown that there exist estimates for CARA u that allow
the data (5) to be accommodated without requiring drastic changes in base-
consumption, it should be acknowledged that there are also studies that
suggest substantially lower estimates for a, and that such estimates would
require drastic changes in base-consumption. Macroeconomic studies based
on the consumption data of stockmarket investors and those obtained from
calibrated macroeconomic models designed to match growth and business
cycle facts typically suggest that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is close to 1, and this corresponds to values of a that are closer to 0. Studies
on choice under risk based on data from television game shows also ￿nd
values closer to 0.
4 Concluding Remarks
Without constant marginal utility for money over time, the exponential dis-
counting model has no peculiar testable implications for preferences over
dated rewards, other than basic properties like completeness, transitivity and
8monotonicity. It is readily seen that if a preference % over dated rewards ad-
mits some ￿ regular￿(continuous, increasing with respect to money, decreasing
with respect to time) representation U(m;t), then that representation can
be rewritten in the form (1), even if D is chosen to be exponential. Thus any
nonstandard utility model for % that captures the ￿ndings in experiments
can be replicated behaviorally by an exponential discounting model. Indeed,
qualitative ￿ndings such as preference reversals do not necessarily reject ex-
ponential discounting without the assumption of constant marginal utility
over time.9 Veri￿cation of the constant marginal utility assumption or some
accounting for possibly non-constant marginal utility is therefore desirable
in experimental work on intertemporal choice.
In the literature, various experiments reject exponential discounting on
the basis of dynamic choice data by ￿nding violations of dynamic consis-
tency. However, expectations are relevant here as well. A robust ￿nding in
psychology experiments is the prevalence of positive illusions [12]. If subjects
have an optimistic bias in their expectations about future marginal utility
for money, then experiments will systematically ￿nd a proportion of subjects
that exhibit patience in distant trade-o⁄s but appear to become relatively
less patient in their re-evaluations over time, in line with what is observed in
experiments [6].
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